Focused Deterrence Violence Prevention At Community And Individual Levels by McGarrell, Edmund F.
Marquette Law Review 
Volume 103 
Issue 3 Symposium 2020 Article 12 
2020 
Focused Deterrence Violence Prevention At Community And 
Individual Levels 
Edmund F. McGarrell 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr 
Repository Citation 
Edmund F. McGarrell, Focused Deterrence Violence Prevention At Community And Individual Levels, 103 
Marq. L. Rev. 963 (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol103/iss3/12 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Marquette Law Review by an authorized editor of Marquette Law Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact megan.obrien@marquette.edu. 
MCGARRELL_20APR20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2020 10:42 PM 
 
FOCUSED DETERRENCE VIOLENCE 
PREVENTION AT COMMUNITY AND 
INDIVIDUAL LEVELS  
EDMUND F. MCGARRELL* 
The focused deterrence violence prevention model emerged as part of 
Boston Ceasefire in the mid-1990s.  Since that time, solid research evidence 
has emerged indicating focused deterrence can influence community levels of 
violence, particularly gang- and group-related violence.  It is considered an 
evidence-based violence reduction strategy.  The evidence of the impact on 
individuals, however, is much more limited and mixed.  This Article presents 
the focused deterrence model, reviews the research evidence and considers the 
implications for reducing violent recidivism.  Several lingering research 
questions as well as considerations for leveraging focused deterrence along 
with other recidivism reduction strategies are discussed.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As national homicide and violent crime trends peaked in the early 1990s1, 
policymakers and criminal justice professionals searched for strategies that 
could prevent and reduce levels of violent crime and gun-crime.  Common 
thinking among many criminologists was that crime trends were largely driven 
by macro-level social and economic forces and there was little that could be 
done in a planned and purposive fashion to reduce serious violence.2  In this 
context, a multi-agency, problem solving initiative emerged in Boston focused 
on reducing youth firearms violence.  Known as Boston Ceasefire, this 
problem-solving team developed what has come to be known as the focused 
deterrence model of violence prevention.  Most telling, the evaluation of Boston 
Ceasefire produced eye-catching results.  Youth gun crime dropped by an 
estimated 60% and the city went two and a half years without a youth 
homicide.3  Since that time, evidence of the impact of the focused deterrence 
model has grown. 
This Article describes the focused deterrence model, reviews the research 
evidence indicating a violence reduction effect, and considers the extent to 
which focused deterrence holds potential to reduce incarceration and 
recidivism.   
II.  FOCUSED DETERRENCE MODEL 
The multi-agency team that developed Boston Ceasefire was also notable 
because it included a research partnership with a group of researchers at 
Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.4  The researcher-
practitioner team followed a problem-solving model where they used data and 
intelligence to better understand what was driving youth firearms violence; 
developed strategies; assessed and refined the strategies; and ultimately 
evaluated the impact on youth violence.  The research team was led by David 
Kennedy, who is considered the architect of the focused deterrence model.5 
 
1. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL 
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 57 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997). 
2. An example of such thinking was offered by a Korean graduate student who stated: “crime 
affects criminal justice; criminal justice does not affect crime.”  DAVID E. DUFFEE, EXPLAINING 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMMUNITY THEORY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM xiii (1980). 
3. Anthony A. Braga, David M. Kennedy, Elin J. Waring, & Anne M. Piehl, Problem-Oriented 
Policing, Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire, 38 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 195, 205, 207 (2001). 
4. See id. at 196. 
5. See generally DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME PREVENTION: 
RECONSIDERING THE PROSPECT OF SANCTION 3 (2009). 
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In the focused deterrence model, the “focus” is on the individuals and 
groups believed to be at highest risk for being involved in gun violence.6  Crime 
analysis and street level intelligence is used to analyze violent crime to identify 
the groups currently involved in violence.7  Recognizing that much street 
violence involves ongoing conflicts, disputes over drug selling and other illicit 
activities, and retaliatory violence, the model suggests that continued violence 
is predictable and therefore seeks to interrupt these cycles of violence.8  The 
mechanism for interrupting these patterns is direct communication with high 
risk individuals, gangs, and groups.9  Most commonly this is done through what 
has come to be known as a “call-in” meeting.10  Over time, focused deterrence 
practitioners have increasingly supplemented call-ins with “custom 
notifications.”11  Both techniques seek to deliver a focused deterrence message, 
but the difference is that call-in meetings seek communication with groups of 
high-risk individuals whereas custom notifications are typically delivered to 
one individual.12 
The message delivered in both call-ins and custom notifications is a key 
element of the focused deterrence model.13  Themes include: 
• Based on your behavior and who you are hanging with, we 
believe you are at high risk of being involved in violence, 
as both victim and offender. 
• We are here to let you know that the level of violence is 
unacceptable and we (local, state, and federal law 
enforcement, prosecutors, probation/parole, and 
community partners) are committed to do everything 
possible to reduce the violence. 
• If you and your associates continue to be involved in 
violence, we are going to do everything legally and 
ethically possible to get you off the streets and impose all 
available sanctions. 
• We are holding you, and your associates, responsible for 
any violence connected to your group.14 
 
6. Id. at 123.  
7. Id. at 114.  
8. Id. at 114–15. 
9. Id. at 134–36. 
10. Id. at 155, 162. 
11. See, e.g., id. at 134–35, 155–56. 
12. Id. at 134–35. 
13. See id. at 123–24.  
14. Id. at 134–35. 
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Examples of other groups and individuals who have been subject to 
enforcement, or who have been shot or murdered, are offered to make the 
deterrence message credible.15  Typically, this includes detailed description of 
available sanctions with an emphasis on federal laws related to felons 
possessing and using firearms.16 
The deterrence theme often ends with a message of, “we hope you will 
make other choices and that we will not see you in jail, court, or a morgue.”  At 
this point, the deterrence message shifts to themes of community and social 
support.  This typically involves the “voice of pain” whereby community 
members who have been harmed by gun violence describe the real impact of 
gun violence.17  This usually involves a message of, “I don’t want to see other 
people go through what I have experienced, and I don’t want to see you shot or 
in prison.”  Finally, offers of social support are communicated.18  This involves 
describing services that are available (mentoring, job preparation, identification 
and driver’s licenses, job placement, drug treatment, housing, etc.).19  Often, 
this message is communicated by outreach workers who are frequently people 
who previously were involved in crime and violence but who have turned their 
lives around.20  These same themes are included in custom notifications though 
these are not as detailed as the call-in meeting.21 
An additional key component of the model is follow-up to the meeting.22  
This includes an enforcement response to violent incidents believed to be 
associated with individuals and groups who have received the focused 
deterrence message as well as their associates.23  This is described as the 
“pulling levers” strategy whereby the deterrence message is made credible 
through a wide variety of enforcement actions (e.g., warrant service; 
probation/parole home visits; directed police patrol, etc.).24  Similarly, 
emphasis is placed on delivering social services to those who seek to avail 
 
15. Id. at 3, 27–28. 
16. Id. at 124–25. 
17. Id. at 3.  
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 136, 140. 
21. See id. 134–41.  An excellent description of the call-in and overall model as applied to gang 
and group violence is provided in, Nicholas Corsaro & Robin S. Engel, Most Challenging of Contexts: 
Assessing the Impact of Focused Deterrence on Serious Violence in New Orleans, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUB. POL’Y 471, 474 (2015). 
22. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 136–39. 
23. Id. 
24. Corsaro & Engel, supra note 21, at 474. 
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themselves of such support.25  This often involves partnerships with a variety 
of service providers and coordination by outreach workers to help connect call-
in and custom notification participants to services.26 
Multiple criminological theories underlie the focused deterrence message.27  
Concepts of specific and general deterrence are modified into focused 
deterrence through the idea of direct communication to high risk individuals 
and groups.  Social support and opportunity are key elements, and significant 
attention is given to communicating in a respectful fashion consistent with 
procedural justice theory.28  The engagement of the community and former 
offenders is consistent with efforts to build collective efficacy. 
The most common application of the focused deterrence message is to 
gang- and group-related violence.  This also attempts to take advantage of 
informal social networks with the idea that participants in call-ins and custom 
notifications will spread the word to associates.  As described in the subsequent 
Section, the research foundation for focused deterrence is most compelling in 
terms of a reduction of gang- and group-related violence measured at the 
community level.  The focused deterrence model has also been extended to drug 
market violence, chronic violent offenders, prisoner re-entry and intimate 
partner violence.  Here, the research is promising but the evidence is less 
extensive.  This research foundation and some of the lingering policy questions 
are discussed in the next sections. 
III.  THE EVIDENCE FOR THE FOCUSED DETERRENCE VIOLENCE PREVENTION 
MODEL 
Following the success of Boston Ceasefire, a number of cities implemented 
the focused deterrence model.  Most commonly this involved application to 
gang- and group-violence.  Early studies were conducted in Los Angeles, 
Indianapolis, Lowell, and Stockton.29  Since these early studies, additional 
 
25. Id. at 479–80. 
26. Id. at 475, 479. 
27. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 9–14. 
28. Anthony A. Braga, David Weisburd, & Brandon Turhcan, Focused Deterrence Strategies 
and Crime Control: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence, 17 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 205, 213, 240 (2018).  
29. See, e.g., GEORGE E. TITA, K. JACK RILEY, GREG RIDGEWAY, & PETER W. GREENWOOD, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE: OPERATION CEASEFIRE IN LOS ANGELES (2005) 
(Los Angeles); Anthony A. Braga, Pulling Levers Focused Deterrence Strategies and the Prevention 
of Gun Homicide, 36 J. CRIM. JUST. 332, 332 (2008) (Stockton); Anthony A. Braga, Jack McDevitt, & 
Glen L. Pierce, Understanding and Preventing Gang Violence: Problem Analysis and Response 
Development in Lowell, Massachusetts, 9 POLICE Q. 20, 22 (2006) (Lowell); Anthony A. Braga, Glen 
L. Pierce, Jack McDevitt, Brenda J. Bond, & Shea Cronin, The Strategic Prevention of Gun Violence 
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evaluations have emerged along with several systematic reviews of research 
evidence of focused deterrence.30  As will be discussed, most of the studies and 
the most consistent evidence comes from evaluations of the gang- and group-
strategy and its impact at a community level (e.g., police precincts, 
neighborhoods, city).  Much less research has focused on strategies aimed at 
high-risk individuals, re-entry, or intimate partner violence.  Similarly, research 
has tended to focus on impact at the community level as opposed to impact on 
individuals.  The following Section reviews this evidence. 
A.  Impact at the Community Level 
Braga, Weisburd and colleagues have provided a great service through their 
systematic reviews of evaluation studies of focused deterrence programs.31  The 
reviews include screening criteria where only studies meeting criteria for 
research rigor are included.  The following section draws heavily on these 
reviews, supplemented with several more recent studies. 
As noted above, the most extensive research and evidence comes from 
evaluations of the gang- and group-strategy examining impact at the 
community level.32  Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan report a dozen studies with 
consistent findings of reduced violence at the community level.33  Outcome 
measures typically included homicides, fatal and nonfatal shootings, shooting 
victimization, and/or other violent crime indicators.34  These studies also 
reported the highest effect sizes.35 
The second largest group of studies focused on the Drug Market 
Intervention (DMI).36  The DMI focused deterrence strategy is very similar to 
 
Among Gang-Involved Offenders, 25 JUST. Q. 132, 134, 137–38 (2008) (Lowell); Edmund F. 
McGarrell, Steven Chermak, Jeremy M. Wilson, & Nicholas Coraro, Reducing Homicide Through a 
“Lever-Pulling” Strategy, 23 JUST. Q. 214 (2006) (Indianapolis). 
30. See, e.g., Anthony A. Braga & David L. Weisburd, The Effects of Focused Deterrence 
Strategies on Crime: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence, 49 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 323, 323–24 (2012); Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, supra note 28. 
31. See, e.g., Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, supra note 28; Braga & Weisburd, supra note 30. 
32. Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, supra note 28, at 209; Braga & Weisburd, supra note 30, at 
326–27. 
33. Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, supra note 28, at 220–28. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 232–34.  
36. NATALIE KROOVAND HIPPLE & EDMUND F. MCGARRELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
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the gang- and group-strategy.  Distinctions include that the focus is on people 
involved in a specific illegal drug market; and undercover drug enforcement 
operations are used to build cases on people involved in drug sales that are then 
held open as a way of making the deterrence message very credible.37  The DMI 
strategy also includes intentional efforts at community engagement to provide 
a community voice (“we are tired of the drug dealing and the violence it 
brings”) as well as to build collective efficacy to sustain the short-term impact 
over time.38  Nine studies of DMI interventions are included in the review.39  
Overall, they demonstrate reduced violence at the community level, though the 
results are uneven across the nine studies.40  The mixed results are believed to 
indicate challenges associated with implementing the DMI model.41 
Several additional studies examine impact at the community level.  Clark-
Moorman, Rydberg, and McGarrell studied the impact of a gun-involved re-
entry program in Rockford, Illinois.42  The re-entry program focused on 
individuals with a history of being involved in gun violence who were returning 
to the community from prison.43  These parolees were ordered to a call-in 
meeting shortly after release to Rockford.44  The call-in meeting included the 
same themes described above but with a welcome home.45  Clark-Moorman, 
Rydberg, and McGarrell report a significant decline in both firearms and non-
firearms violence at the city level.46   
 
37. Id. at 3–4. 
38. Collective efficacy refers to neighborhood social bonds and informal social control.  See 
ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD 
EFFECT 152–54 (2012). 
39. Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, supra note 28, at 220–28. 
40. Id. at 223–28, 234. 
41. Id. at 240–41; see also JESSICA SAUNDERS, ALLISON J. OBER, BEAU KILMER, & SARAH 
MICHAL GREATHOUSE, RAND, A COMMUNITY-BASED, FOCUSED-DETERRENCE APPROACH TO 
CLOSING OVERT DRUG MARKETS: A PROCESS AND FIDELITY EVALUATION OF SEVEN SITES 58–69 
(2016). 
42. See Kyleigh Clark-Moorman, Jason Rydberg, & Edmund F. McGarrell, Impact Evaluation 
of a Parolee-Based Focused Deterrence Program on Community-Level Violence, 30 CRIM. JUST. 
POL’Y REV. 1408, 1409 (2018).  
43. Id. at 1413–14. 
44. Id. at 1413.  
45. Id. at 1414.  
46. Id. at 1416–22.  The Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership focused deterrence 
program conducted a pilot application to re-entry that was quite similar in concept to the Rockford 
program.  See Edmund F. McGarrell, Duren Banks, & Natalie Hipple, Community Meetings as a Tool 
in Inmate Reentry, JUST. RES. & POL’Y, Dec. 2003, at 14–17.  The results were considered promising 
as individuals returning to the community with prior violent crime experience who participated in the 
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Similar results emerge from Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods focused 
deterrence strategy.  This also involved parolee forums but, in this case, 
parolees were eligible if they were released within nine months of the call-in.47  
Consequently, Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan treat this as an example of a focus 
on high-risk individuals as opposed to a re-entry program.48  The study found 
significant reductions in homicides in the Chicago police divisions that 
participated in the program.49 
In addition to several DMI studies believed to involve implementation 
problems, two studies examining impact at the community level did not follow 
the pattern of finding a violence reduction.  Newark’s Operation Ceasefire 
focused on high risk gang members but through a “hybrid” design that 
emphasized street outreach.50  Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan treated this as a 
high-risk individual focused deterrence program.51  The study found no 
reduction in gunshot injuries.52  Kansas City’s No Violence Alliance initiative 
was a gang- and group-focused deterrence initiative.53  The evaluators found 
short term violence reduction but that it was not sustained over time.54  This 
point will be returned to subsequently.55 
B.  Impact at the Gang- and Group-Level 
Recognizing that the focus of many focused deterrence programs is 
reducing gang- and group-related violence, several studies examined whether 
the strategy reduced gang- and group-violence specifically.  The original 
Indianapolis findings were re-examined to determine whether gang homicides 
were reduced following the implementation of the Indianapolis Violence 
 
call-in re-entry meetings “survived” longer before re-offending.  Id. at 27.  However, overall there was 
no reduction in re-offending and the author’s urged caution given a small sample size.  Id. at 27–28. 
47. Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares, & Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating 
Project Safe Neighborhoods in Chicago, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 223, 247–48 (2007). 
48. See Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, supra note 28, at 223. 
49. Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, supra note 47, at 265. 
50. Douglas J. Boyle, Jennifer L. Lanterman, Joseph E. Pascarella, Chia-Cherng Cheng, The 
Impact of Newark’s Operation Ceasefire on Trauma Center Gunshot Wound Admissions, JUST. RES. 
& POL’Y, Dec. 2010, at 105, 106–07. 
51. Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, supra note 28, at 226. 
52. Boyle, Lanterman, Pascarella, & Cheng, supra note 50, at 118. 
53. Andrew M. Fox & Kenneth J. Novak, Collaborating to Reduce Violence: The Impact of 
Focused Deterrence in Kansas City, 21 POLICE Q. 283, 288 (2018). 
54. Id. at 302. 
55. See infra Section IV.D. 
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Reduction Partnership’s focused deterrence program.56  Corsaro and McGarrell 
found that, indeed, the greatest component of the homicide decline was gang-
related homicides.57  A group of scholars at the University of Cincinnati 
developed the concept of distinguishing gang- and group-member (GMI) 
homicides and non-fatal shootings as a more direct outcome measure of the 
gang- and group-focused deterrence strategy.  They found significant 
reductions in GMI homicides and firearms incidents as part of the Cincinnati 
Initiative to Reduce Violence.58  They later extended this same methodology to 
a study of the New Orleans Group Violence Reduction Strategy, a focused 
deterrence initiative aimed at gang- and group-violence.  The results were very 
similar with significant reductions in GMI homicides.59  
Several additional researchers took this idea a step further and examined 
the impact on gangs and groups involved in a focused deterrence program 
compared to other gangs and groups not touched by the program.  In Boston, 
total shootings declined over 30% for “treatment” gangs when contrasted with 
shootings by comparable non-treatment gangs.60  Similar results emerged in a 
study of Chicago’s Group Violence Reduction focused deterrence initiative.  
Specifically, the study reported a 23% reduction in gun crime and a 32% 
reduction in gunshot victimization for gangs involved in the focused deterrence 
program.61 
When combined with the above section on the gang- and group-focused 
deterrence strategy impact at the community level, there is strong evidence 
supporting this strategy for impact at the community-, gang-, and group-levels. 
 
56. Nicholas Corsaro & Edmund F. McGarrell, Testing a Promising Homicide Reduction 
Strategy: Reassessing the Impact of the Indianapolis “Pulling Levers” Intervention, 5 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 63, 69 (2009). 
57. Id. at 78–79; see also Nicholas Corsaro & Edmund F. McGarrell, Reducing Homicide Risk 
in Indianapolis Between 1997 and 2000, 87 J. URB. HEALTH 851, 861–62 (2010). 
58. Robin S. Engel, Marie Skubak Tillyer, & Nicholas Corsaro, Reducing Gang Violence Using 
Focused Deterrence: Evaluating the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV), 30 JUST. Q. 403, 
430–31 (2013). 
59. Corsaro & Engel, supra note 21, at 486–87. 
60. Anthony A. Braga, David M. Hureau, & Andrew V. Papachristos, Deterring Gang-Involved 
Gun Violence: Measuring the Impact of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire on Street Gang Behavior, 30 J. 
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 113, 134 (2014). 
61. Andrew V. Papachristos & David S. Kirk, Changing the Street Dynamic: Evaluating 
Chicago’s Group Violence Reduction Strategy, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 525, 550–51 (2015). 
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C.  Impact at the Individual Level 
1.  Re-entry 
The Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods program included a focus on 
individuals believed to be at high risk for violent re-offending.  Specifically, 
this focused deterrence strategy included a re-entry program whereby 
individuals returning to the community from prison (within three to six months 
of release), with a history of gun violence, were required by their parole agents 
to attend a call-in meeting.62  The call-in was quite similar to that described in 
the gang-focused deterrence call-ins, but attention was made to welcome the 
participants back to the community and to recognize that they had largely 
completed their sentences (“debt to society”).63  Additionally, heavy emphasis 
was placed on describing and encouraging available services to assist in the 
transition back to the community.64  Significant attention was given to balance 
the deterrence message with themes of procedural justice and legitimacy.65  The 
evaluation of this Chicago Project Safe Neighborhoods program found that 
parolees attending the call-ins experienced a significant reduction in 
recidivism.66 
2.  Intimate Partner Violence 
The community of High Point, North Carolina, utilized the focused 
deterrence strategy to address gang- and group-violence, street robberies, and 
drug market related violence.  They gained further attention through the 
application of the focused deterrence strategy to the problem of intimate partner 
violence.  In brief, the strategy involves a graduated sanction approach to 
intimate partner violence offenders and couples this with attempts to link 
 
62. Danielle Wallace, Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey Meares, & Jeffrey Fagan, Desistance and 
Legitimacy: The Impact of Offender Notification Meetings on Recidivism Among High Risk Offenders, 
33 JUST. Q. 1237, 1243–44 (2016). 
63. See id. at 1244. 
64. Id. at 1246. 
65. Id. at 1244. 
66. Id. at 1259.  The Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership focused deterrence program 
conducted a pilot application to re-entry that was quite similar in concept to the Chicago and Rockford 
programs.  McGarrell, Banks, & Hipple, supra note 46, at 14–17.  The results were considered 
promising as individuals returning to the community with prior violent crime experience who 
participated in the call-in re-entry meetings “survived” longer before re-offending.  Id. at 27.  However, 
overall there was no reduction in re-offending and the author’s urged caution given a small sample 
size.  Id.  
 
MCGARRELL_20APR20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2020  10:42 PM 
2020] FOCUSED DETERRENCE VIOLENCE PREVENTION 973 
victims to services and to provide protective measures to victims.67  One initial 
study of the focused deterrence intimate partner violence strategy has been 
conducted.  After one year, there was a 20% decline in intimate partner violence 
arrests and calls for police service.68  Victim injuries also declined.69  Just under 
17% of the targeted offenders had been re-arrested within twelve months of the 
focused deterrence notification.70  The recidivism results are difficult to 
interpret due to the lack of an available comparison group.  Overall, however, 
the results are promising and support continued experimentation and evaluation 
of the intimate partner focused deterrence strategy.71  
3.  Gang-, Group- and High-Risk People Strategy Impact at Individual Level 
Several studies have examined the effects of the focused deterrence strategy 
on individuals based on either the gang-group strategy or the high-risk people 
strategy. 
The Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership included evaluations of 
the impact on individuals participating in call-in meetings based on the gang- 
and group-focused deterrence strategy.72  The participants were chosen based 
on the belief that their prior involvement in gun crime and their gang- and 
group-associations put them at high risk for continued involvement in gun 
crime.73  Although the research team found significant declines in homicides 
and gun assaults at the community level, they did not find that call-in attendees 
were less likely to re-offend when compared to a similar group of probationers 
and parolees.74   
One of the limitations of the evaluation and a challenge for all assessments 
of individual effects of focused deterrence, however, was that it was difficult to 
develop a comparison group.  Although the comparison group of probationers 
and parolees had similar criminal histories, the participants in the call-in 
meetings were purposefully selected based on their gang connections and 
 
67. Stacy M. Sechrist & John D. Weil, Assessing the Impact of a Focused Deterrence Strategy 
to Combat Intimate Partner Domestic Violence, 24 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 243, 247–48 (2018). 
68. Id. at 251. 
69. Id. at 260. 
70. Id. at 259. 
71. Id. at 263. 
72. Steven Chermak & Edmund McGarrell, Problem-Solving Approaches to Homicide: An 
Evaluation of the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership, 15 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 161, 166 
(2004). 
73. Id. at 168. 
74. Id. at 182. 
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perceived high risk.75  To address this issue, a randomized controlled 
experiment was conducted as a follow-up.76   
The experiment was also designed to address the relative effectiveness of 
two slightly different variations in the call-in meeting.77  The first meeting type 
was that most akin to the traditional focused deterrence call-in and was labeled 
the focused deterrence meeting.78  The second meeting type put a greater 
emphasis on the impact of violence in the community as well as more in-depth 
discussion of available services and encouragement to access such services.79  
These were labeled community meetings.80  Eligible probationers and parolees 
were randomly assigned to one of three treatment conditions: focused 
deterrence meeting, community meeting, or standard probation/parole with no 
call-in meeting.81  The results found no difference among the three groups.82  
There were no differences in the number of new arrests, convictions, or the 
length of time to new offense.83  The lead researcher, however, offered a caveat 
in interpreting the results.84  Specifically, the experiment occurred at a time that 
the Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership had already witnessed 
significant declines in community homicides and firearms violence.85  There 
had been several changes in key leadership of the focused deterrence team.86  
This raised the question of whether the strategy was still being implemented 
with the same dosage and intensity that it was when firearms violence was 
considered at extreme levels in Indianapolis.87  Thus, it was difficult to discern 
whether the lack of an impact was due to a limit in the model itself or to the 
level of implementation intensity and fidelity at the time of the evaluation. 
One international study examined the effect of the high-risk individuals 
focused deterrence strategy on youth violence.  This study from Glasgow, 
Scotland examined the impact on youth weapon carrying and found a 
 
75. Id. at 168. 
76. STEVEN CHERMAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REDUCING VIOLENT CRIME AND FIREARMS 
VIOLENCE: THE INDIANAPOLIS “LEVER-PULLING” EXPERIMENT 5–6 (2008).  
77. Id. at 5. 
78. Id.  
79. Id.  
80. Id.  
81. Id. at 5–6. 
82. Id. at 8. 
83. Id.  
84. See id. at 12–15. 
85. Id. at 4–5. 
86. See id. at 13–14. 
87. See id. at 14. 
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significant reduction in weapon carrying among youths participating in the 
focused deterrence program.88 
Two more recent studies have examined the individual-level effects of the 
focused deterrence strategy.  The first also involved a randomized experiment 
of a program known as “Regional Analytics for the Safety of our Residents” 
(RASOR) in three Massachusetts communities.89  This program involved the 
application of the focused deterrence strategy applied to high-risk individuals.90  
Police reports were used to develop a “social harm risk index.”91  The social 
harm index was based on criminal histories and prioritized individuals involved 
in gun, gang, and drug offenses and considered how current the offending 
patterns were.92  The social harm index was used to identify what were 
considered the highest risk individuals in the three communities.93  The 
experimental design was then used to assign these high-risk individuals to either 
a focused deterrence call-in meeting or the comparison group that received no 
unusual law enforcement attention.94  An interesting addition to the model was 
that the treatment group was assigned to a police-social worker case 
management team that attempted to work with the individuals following the 
call-in meeting to engage with social services.95  The results of the experiment 
were consistent with those described above in the Indianapolis experiment.  
There was no difference in the outcome measure, time to new arraignment, 
between the treatment and comparison groups.96 
More promising results emerge from a recent study of the individual effects 
of the gang- and group-focused deterrence strategy in Detroit.  Like many of 
the above studies, the Detroit focused deterrence study had found declines in 
community levels of violence associated with the strategy.97  The initial analysis 
 
88. D.J. Williams, D. Currie, W. Linden, & P.D. Donnelly, Addressing Gang-Related Violence 
in Glasgow: A Preliminary Pragmatic Quasi-Experimental Evaluation of the Community Initiative to 
Reduce Violence (CIRV), 19 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 686, 687–88 (2014). 
89. Craig D. Uchida, Marc Swatt, Julie Schnobrich-Davis, Christine Connor, Mariel Shutinya, 
& Daniel Wagner, A Randomized Control Trial of a Targeted High-Risk Offender Program Across 
Three Jurisdictions, 22 POLICE Q. 192, 193 (2019). 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 197. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 197–98. 
95. Id. at 198. 
96. Id. at 209. 
97. GIOVANNI CIRCO, EDMUND F. MCGARRELL, JULIE M. KRUPA, & ALAINA DE BIASI, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DETROIT CEASEFIRE: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT 33 (2018), 
https://www.jrsa.org/pubs/sac-digest/vol-29/mi-detroit-ceasefire.pdf [https://perma.cc/4699-34Q2]. 
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of individual level effects was similar to the first Indianapolis study described 
above.98  That is, it compared participants in call-in meetings with a group of 
probationers/parolees who were similar in terms of age, gender, race, and prior 
criminal histories.99  There were few differences found in terms of 
recidivism.100  However, the research team noted that the treatment group was 
different than the comparison group because they were selected on the basis of 
their associations with gangs and groups involved in firearms violence and thus 
were likely at higher risk than the comparison group.101 
In a follow-up, the research team was able to limit the comparison group of 
probationers and parolees to those with gang- and group-affiliations.102  In this 
way, the treatment and comparison groups were considered much more 
equivalent in terms of their level of risk for subsequent offending.  The results 
found that the call-in treatment group had significantly longer survival rates 
(time to new offense) for all crimes as well as for violent crimes specifically.103  
Initially, the treatment group was more likely to be re-arrested for a weapons 
offense but the researchers thought this likely reflected the proactive 
enforcement of the focused deterrence strategy that included enforcement 
responses to violent crime incidents as well as increased home visits to 
probationers and parolees involved in the focused deterrence program.104  Over 
time, the control group witnessed higher levels of weapons offenses compared 
to the treatment group involved in the focused deterrence initiative.105 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS/QUESTIONS 
As described above, the evidence supporting the focused deterrence model 
is primarily at the community level.  That is, communities, whether 
 
98. See CHERMAK, supra note 76; Chermak & McGarrell, supra note 72. 
99. CIRCO, MCGARRELL, KRUPA, & DE BIASI, supra note 97, at 27. 
100. Id. at 32. 
101. Id. at 34.  The elevated risk associated with participation in gangs and “co-offending 
shooting networks” has been documented in abundant research.  See, e.g., Chris Melde & Finn-Aage 
Esbensen, Gangs and Violence: Disentangling the Impact of Gang Membership on the Level and 
Nature of Offending, 29 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 143, 160 (2013); Andrew V. Papachristos, 
Christopher Wildeman, & Elizabeth Roberto, Tragic, But Not Random: The Social Contagion of 
Nonfatal Gunshot Injuries, 125 SOC. SCI. & MED. 139, 147 (2015); David C. Pyrooz, Richard K. Moule 
Jr., & Scott H. Decker, The Contribution of Gang Membership to the Victim–Offender Overlap, 51 J. 
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 315, 334 (2014). 
102. Giovanni Circo, Julie M. Krupa, Edmund McGarrell, & Alaina DeBiasi, The Individual-
Level Deterrent Effect of “Call-In” Meetings on Time to Re-Arrest, CRIME & DELINQ. ONLINEFIRST, 
Oct. 31, 2019, at 1, 10. 
103. Id. at 15.  
104. Id. at 15–16.  
105. Id. at 16.  
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neighborhoods, police precincts or divisions, or cities, have often experienced 
significant declines in violent crime following the implementation of the 
focused deterrence strategy.  The evidence for impact at the individual level is 
both more limited in volume and mixed in findings.  This raises questions in 
terms of the impact on violent recidivism.  Additionally, review of the research 
raises several additional questions that will be considered in the following 
sections. 
A.  Impact on Violent Recidivism 
Study of the community level impact of focused deterrence does not 
directly address the question of impact on individual-level violent recidivism.  
Having said this, it is worth noting that an overall impact on community levels 
of violence is likely to have an indirect effect on violent recidivism.  At a basic 
level, each reduction in fatal and non-fatal shootings is likely to reduce the 
number of individuals incarcerated for serious gun violence.  That reduces 
violent recidivism at a macro level.  Beyond this effect, the claim of an indirect 
effect is based on several research-based characteristics of violent crime.  First, 
much violent crime is episodic and related to lifestyles that put people in risky 
situations.106  Violence demonstrates patterns of contagion107 and being 
involved in shooting networks greatly elevates the risk for all network members 
being involved in future violence.108  If overall levels of violence in the 
community decline, it would seem to reduce the likelihood of violent recidivism 
through the reduction in risky contexts that can lead to violent incidents among 
high-risk individuals. 
More directly, the limited findings of focused deterrence re-entry efforts at 
the individual level suggests promise for reducing violent recidivism.  This is 
most apparent in Chicago’s parolee forums that used the focused deterrence 
call-in strategy with high-risk parolees returning to the community.109  
Although the research findings are limited, the positive results support 
 
106. Jesenia M. Pizarro, Kristen M. Zgoba, & Wesley G. Jennings, Assessing the Interaction 
Between Offender and Victim Criminal Lifestyles & Homicide Type, 39 J. CRIM. JUST. 367, 374 (2011). 
107. April M. Zeoli, Jesenia M. Pizarro, Sue C. Grady & Christopher Melde, Homicide as 
Infectious Disease: Using Public Health Methods to Investigate the Diffusion of Homicide, 31 JUST. 
Q. 609, 610 (2014). 
108. Papachristos, Wildeman, & Roberto, supra note 101, at 147. 
109. Wallace, Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, supra note 62.  For an example of parolee 
meetings in Marion County, Indiana, see McGarrell, Banks, & Hipple, supra note 46. 
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continued experimentation and testing, particularly given the related research 
indicating violence reduction at the community level.110 
Finally, the evidence of the gang/group focused deterrence strategy at the 
individual level is very mixed.  Although there is no evidence of “backfire” 
effects, several studies have found no evidence of reduced re-offending at the 
individual level.111  On the other hand, several studies have found reduced 
levels of re-offending when the comparison group appears to be of equivalent 
risk.112  Given the consistent finding of impact at the community level, there 
appears to be reason to continue to study patterns of violent recidivism at the 
individual level.  In pursuing this research, several questions arise.  These 
include the consistency with best practices in corrections, better understanding 
of how these strategies are perceived by the individuals affected by the 
strategies, and whether short-term effects are sustained over time.   
B.  Consistency with Correctional Best Practices 
Contemporary thinking in correctional best practice suggests the idea of 
using Risk, Need and Responsivity (RNR) principles in developing and 
delivering treatment services.  The risk principle suggests that correctional 
services should be tailored to the level of risk to re-offend.113  The need 
principle refers to individual needs that are associated with criminal 
behavior.114  These refer to factors such as antisocial personality, pro-criminal 
attitudes, friends and associates involved in crime, and substance abuse.  
Responsivity refers to tailoring services to the specific needs of individuals 
based on risk and need.115  Considerable work has gone into developing 
assessment tools to measure risk and need and thereby develop individualized 
treatment plans.116  
The focused deterrence strategy is also designed around the concept of risk.  
Individuals invited to call-in meetings are based on their elevated risk due to 
gang and group affiliation; involvement in illegal drug markets; histories of 
violence; and similar factors.  Having said this, selection and the offer of 
 
110. Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, supra note 47, at 265; Clark-Moorman, Rydberg, & 
McGarrell, supra note 42, at 1423–24. 
111. CHERMAK, supra note 76, at 12; Fox & Novak, supra note 53, at 302. 
112. E.g., Circo, Krupa, McGarrell, & DeBiasi, supra note 102, at 15.  But see Uchida, Swatt, 
Schnobrich-Davis, Connor, Shutinya, & Wagner, supra note 89, at 209 (presenting contrary evidence). 
113. D.A. Andrews, James Bonta, & J. Stephen Wormith, The Recent Past and Near Future of 
Risk and/or Need Assessment, 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 7 (2006). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. See, e.g., RNR Simulation Tool, CTR. FOR ADVANCING CORRECTIONAL EXCELLENCE, 
https://www.gmuace.org/tools_justice-professionals.html [https://perma.cc/N6DV-G8W9]. 
MCGARRELL_20APR20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2020  10:42 PM 
2020] FOCUSED DETERRENCE VIOLENCE PREVENTION 979 
services is not based on systematic risk and need assessment and responsivity 
assessment (RNR principles) used to customize individual treatment plans.  The 
practical issues of increasing the use of risk, need, and responsivity to 
customize services for participants in focused deterrence programs are 
formidable.  Many participants in focused deterrence call-ins do not express an 
interest in services and do not follow-up to offers of support.  Having said this, 
to the extent that focused deterrence service delivery could be customized based 
on RNR models, correctional research would suggest we could expect greater 
reductions in violent recidivism.  These findings suggest that police-probation-
parole cooperation and coordination, as observed in Detroit’s embedded 
corrections agent program, could be an important ingredient to increasing the 
efficacy of focused deterrence to address violent recidivism.117 
C.  How is Focused Deterrence Perceived by Participants? 
As noted earlier, there are many theoretical foundations of focused 
deterrence that are presumed to relate to the causal mechanisms of the model.  
These include changes in perceived deterrence (increasing certainty, severity, 
and celerity), social support and increased opportunity, procedural justice, 
community voice, and similar factors.  Very little research has examined how 
the participants in focused deterrence perceive the call-in meetings, how they 
perceive the messages they receive, what they consider the influential 
components of the model, and similar issues.118  This lack of understanding of 
the perceptions of participants also makes it difficult to measure the fidelity and 
dosage of any particular focused deterrence program.  An important avenue of 
future research on focused deterrence, that may also offer insight to the issue of 
violent recidivism, is to better understand the perception of focused deterrence 
from the perspective of participants. 
D.  Short- and Long-term Effects  
Despite the strong evidence of community level effects, questions remain 
about the sustainability of these effects over time.  This was first observed in 
the original Boston Ceasefire initiative as well as the early replication in the 
 
117. See Circo, Krupa, McGarrell, & De Biasi, supra note 102, at 15. 
118. One example of this type of approach was developed in the initial Indianapolis evaluation 
of the focused deterrence strategy.  Chermak & McGarrell, supra note 72, at 175–79.  Here, a series of 
interviews of recently arrested individuals was conducted in the local jail’s booking facility.  Id. at 167.  
A short survey was administered that asked arrestees of their perception of the likelihood of arrest and 
prosecution for homicide, robbery, and drug sales.  Id. at 175–76.  The results suggested that there was 
an increase in the perceived likelihood of arrest and sanctions in the period following the 
implementation of focused deterrence call-in meetings.  See id. at 178–79. 
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Indianapolis Violence Reduction Partnership.119  After their significant 
declines, there was some evidence of rebound in serious violence over time 
(though not reaching the earlier peak levels).120  More systematically, a recent 
study of Kansas City’s focused deterrence strategy found a short-term violence 
reduction but that the results decayed over the course of a two-year study.121   
The question of sustaining long-terms effects has often been interpreted as 
indicative of the challenge of sustaining implementation over time, particularly 
after the crisis levels of violence no longer exist.  For example, the success of 
Boston Ceasefire resulted in a number of key team members being promoted 
and no longer involved in the focused deterrence initiative.122  Similar patterns 
were reported in Indianapolis.123  Thus, one potential explanation is that it is 
difficult to sustain the multi-agency focused deterrence strategy over time. 
Another potential explanation is theoretical.  What if the impact of the call-
in meeting decays over time?  Does the shift in perceived deterrence decay over 
time as participants see members of their social networks involved in gun 
violence with no arrest and no prosecution?  This seems particularly likely 
given the low rates of clearance by arrest and closure by prosecution in non-
fatal shootings.124  When one considers the high geographic concentration of 
firearms violence,125 it seems that focused deterrence participants, in contrast 
to the general public, are much more likely to be aware of shooting victims 
whose shooters were never arrested or shooters who are walking free.  Does 
this lead to decay of the deterrence message?  Similarly, if services are promised 
but then not provided, does the legitimacy of the message decay in the eyes of 
participants?  Currently, there is very little research on such issues, but it seems 
 
119. CIRCO, MCGARRELL, KRUPA, & DE BIASI, supra note 97, at 3. 
120. See Braga, Weisburd, & Turchan, supra note 28, at 207. 
121. Fox & Novak, supra note 53, at 302. 
122. See Braga, Hureau, & Papachristos, supra note 60, at 131–32. 
123. CHERMAK, supra note 76, at 13–14. 
124. Clearance rates in non-fatal shootings are not regularly reported by most police 
departments.  Limited research and journalistic investigations suggest rates well below 30% for many 
cities.  E.g., SALMAFATIMA S. ABADIN & MALLORY E. O’BRIEN, MILWAUKEE HOMICIDE REV. 
COMM’N, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT: HOMICIDES AND NONFATAL SHOOTINGS IN MILWAUKEE 27 (2017); 
Irshad Altheimer, John Klofas, & Chris Sweadner, Shooting Case Clearance in Rochester, NY 5 (Ctr. 
for Pub. Safety Initiatives Working Paper No. 2018-07, 2018); Annie Sweeney & Jeremy Gorner, 
Chicago Police Solve One in Every 20 Shootings. Here Are Some Reasons Why That’s So Low, CHI. 
TRIB. (Aug. 8, 2018, 5:00 AM) https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-chicago-
violence-clearance-rate-20180807-story.html [https://perma.cc/X7KD-HGW3].  
125. Anthony A. Braga, Andrew V. Papachristos, & David M. Hureau, The Concentration and 
Stability of Gun Violence at Micro Places in Boston, 1980–2008, 26 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 
33, 34 (2010). 
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warranted to better understand the promise of the focused deterrence model for 
sustained community level violence prevention as well as viability as a violent 
recidivism reduction strategy. 
The issue of potential decay may also raise the issue of complementing the 
focused deterrence strategy with other violence prevention strategies.  At the 
community level, complementing focused deterrence with place-based, 
evidence-based strategies may help overcome the potential for short-term but 
non-sustained effects.  This may include enforcement (e.g., directed police 
patrol); intervention (e.g., problem solving at specific hotspot locations; 
technology), and preventative community development such as disorder 
reduction, “greening”, and efforts to build collective efficacy.126  At the 
individual level, as noted above, research to better understand the perceptions 
of program participants, as well as experimentation with the use of RNR 
principles in providing support to focused deterrence participants, may offer 
clues as to increasing the likelihood of reducing violent recidivism. 
V.  SUMMARY 
These questions do not suggest that the focused deterrence strategy be 
discontinued.  Clearly, the strong evidence of impact at the community level 
for reducing serious gun violence is reason to adopt the focused deterrence 
strategy.  Given the exorbitant costs associated with each firearms injury,127 as 
well as the costs to victims, families, and communities, there is ample reason 
to use this evidence-based strategy.  At the same time, to reduce violent 
recidivism, there are reasons to believe that focused deterrence may indirectly 
reduce violent re-offending as well as enough promise of direct effects for 
continued experimentation, refinement, and study. 
 
126. ANTHONY A. BRAGA, PROBLEM ORIENTED POLICING AND CRIME PREVENTION 4–5 (2d 
ed. 2008); Anthony A. Braga, Andrew V. Papachristos, & David Hureau, The Effects of Hot Spots 
Policing on Crime: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 31 JUST. Q. 633, 637 (2014); 
Richard Casey Sadler, Jesenia Pizarro, Brandon Turchan, Steven P. Gasteyer, & Edmund F. McGarrell, 
Exploring the Spatial-Temporal Relationships Between a Community Greening Program and 
Neighborhood Rates of Crime, 83 APPLIED GEOGRAPHY 13, 13 (2017); David Weisburd, Michael 
Davis, & Charlotte Gill, Increasing Collective Efficacy and Social Capital at Crime Hot Spots: New 
Crime Control Tools for Police, 9 POLICING 265, 272 (2015). 
127. PAUL HEATON, RAND, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: WHAT COST-OF-CRIME RESEARCH CAN 
TELL US ABOUT INVESTING IN POLICE 2–3 (2010), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP279.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7TBJ-K6PL]. 
